A new Afghan nightmare
A new Afghan nightmare
Ramzy Baroud
When US envoy to Afghanistan Richard Holbrooke met with Afghanistan’s "democratically" installed President Hamid Karzai in Kabul on Feb. 14, he may have just learned of the historic significance of the following day. Feb. 15 commemorates the end of the bloody Russian campaign against Afghanistan (August 1978-February 1989)
But it is unlikely that Holbrooke will absorb the magnitude of that historic lesson. Both he and the new US President Barack Obama are convinced that the missing component for winning the war in Afghanistan is a greater commitment, as in doubling troops, increasing military spending, and, by way of winning hearts and minds, investing more in developing the country. That combination, the US administration believes, will eventually sway Afghans from supporting the Taleban, tribal militias, Pashtun nationalists and other groups. The latter is waging a guerrilla struggle in various parts of the country, mostly in the south, to oust Karzai’s government and foreign occupation forces. While Kabul was considered an "oasis of calm" – by Jonathan Steele’s account – during the Soviet rule, it’s nowhere close to that depiction under the rule of the US and its NATO allies, who had plenty of time, eight long years, to assert their control, but failed.
